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Deeply held commitments to individualism, atomism, and egoism have moved psychology to underestimate the frequency and significance of altruism and to seek
explanations of examples of altruism that are based in the self-interested motives
of the altruists. In this article, I review evidence that altruism is pervasive and discuss
the conditions that promote its development in children and its display in adults.
However, I suggest that there is nothing natural or inevitable about the pervasiveness
of altruism-that
large-scale cultural influences that regulate social relations and
contribute to establishing the boundaries between self and other can have profound
effects on altruism. The contemporary United States, with its emphasis on market
relations between free and autonomous individuals, exemplifies the cultural conditions least conducive to altruism.

Historically, psychology has been guided by several theoretical presumptions that are so deep and pervasive that they are rarely noticed.
These presumptions can be identified as methodological individualism,
psychological atomism, egoism, and naturalism. Together, these presumptions imply that the proper unit for scientific analysis is the
individual (methodological individualism), that the boundaries between different individuals are clear and distinct (psychological atomism), that individuals are interested primarily, if not exclusively, in
themselves (egoism), and that all of this is "natural," is nature's way.
Although psychology is certainly not unique among the human sciences in these presumptions, there is virtually no major area of psychology that is untouched by them.' These presumptions figure prominently when psychologists confront the phenomenon of altruism. The
apparent fact that people will (sometimes, often, occasionally) act to
Social Service Review (September 1993).
© 1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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serve the interests of others, even at substantialcost to themselves,
becomes a puzzle that demands investigation and explanation. The
very definition of altruism ("devotionto the interests of others; opposed to egoism,"as one dictionaryhas it) dependson these theoretical
presumptions. If people were not psychologicalatoms, dedicated to
their own interests-if the boundaries between self and other were
not clear and distinct-altruism as a distinct phenomenon might not
even exist. But because of these presumptions, it does exist and so
must be explained.
Or better, it must be explained away.In biology,it may be explained
away by means of the "selfishgene" and the concepts of kin selection,
inclusive fitness, and reciprocalaltruism that accompany selfish-gene
theory.2 In economics, it may be explained away by the tautological
notion of "preference maximization,"which assumes that all choices
maximize the preferences of the individualswho make them so that
"it is ordinarilyboth convenient and reasonable for economics to ...
treat the individualas satisfyinghis preferenceswithoutdealingexplicitly with the possibilitythat his preferences include a taste for helping
other people."3In psychology,it may be explained away by appeal to
similarlytautologicalnotions such as mutual reinforcement.In all such
cases, the operating principleis that for altruismto occur, there simply
must be something in it for the altruist and, further, that something
must be not merely an incidental byproduct of the altruisticact but
its cause. Said another way, it is not good enough to claim that when
individuals engage in altruistic acts, they also produce benefits for
themselves. Instead, the claim must be that when people behave altruistically,it is because of the personal benefits derived from these acts.
In the oft-quoted words of Michael Ghiselin, "Scratchan altruistand
watch a hypocrite bleed."4
The net result of these views in the various human sciences is to
make the presumption of egoism virtuallyunfalsifiable.Empiricalevidence to document claims of egoism is rarely required. Reinterpretations of apparentlyaltruisticacts in terms of their "real"egoistic causes
are generated without constraint and accepted without careful scrutiny. Coupled with a more general culturalattitudethat identifiescynicism with realism and sophistication, this orientation of the human
sciences virtuallyguarantees that acts of altruismwill not be accepted
on their face.5 Explanation of any social phenomenon that stops at
altruism without unpacking the egoistic motives underlyingit will be
regarded as incomplete at best.
Within psychology, research on altruism is usually consistent with
the theoretical presumptions I have identified. When examples of
apparent altruism (e.g., children helping one another in play settings,
adults coming to the aid of a stranger in distress) are subjected to
research scrutiny, one of a handful of strategiesis usually employed.
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Perhaps researchers attempt to uncover the "actual"selfish motives
that the altruisticacts serve. Failingthat, they attemptto uncover some
mechanism (socialization,Freudian defense) that underliesit because
it could not be the result, say, of rational deliberationon the part of
the actor.Failingthat, this act may be acceptedon its face, but regarded
as developmentallyprimitive,something immaturethat the actorswill
outgrow.6Finally,failing that, the very concept of altruismin general
may be subjectedto an analysisin termsof some self-interestedconcept
like reinforcement.7
As a result of these strategiesfor explaining awayaltruism,a significant phenomenon is submerged. And as the presumptions and theories from the human sciences become the intellectualcurrencyof the
culture at large, little effort is made to appeal to altruisticmotives or
social concerns in efforts to get people to do the right thing in their
day-to-daylife. Instead, appeals are made that show how one or another seemingly altruisticact will serve the long-term interests of the
actors. Appeals are made for social support for prenatalcare for poor
women not because it is right, but because it will cost less than later
intensive medical care for their infants. Appeals are made to combat
child and wife abuse not because they are evil, but because domestic
abuse costs employers millions of dollars in absenteeismand lowered
job productivity.Appeals are made to improve urban education not
because everyone in a society like ours should be literate, but because
illiteracycosts all of us in welfare payments, unemployment benefits,
and high crime rates.8When appeals to self-interest are believed to
be the only appeals that have any legitimacy,people begin to evaluate
their own options and possibilities from within an egoistic calculus.
The result is that the calculus of self-interest becomes self-fulfilling.
As Jerome Kagan has said, "So many people have come to accept the
truth of that assumption [of self-interestas the only interest] that the
average person now treats it as a natural law."9
I intend to challenge some of these presumptionsby takingaltruism
seriously. I will review briefly the empirical research and theoretical
claims of others who take altruism seriously, and I will outline what
is known about the social conditions that seem to promote altruism.
In the course of this article, it should become apparent that under a
different set of presumptions-presumptions that challenge individualism, atomism, and egoism-altruism becomes not impossible but
ubiquitous.

Examples of Altruism
The phenomena that provoke discussions of altruism range from the
dramatic to the mundane. In the former category are examples of
people who put themselves in great physical danger to assist others,
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whether to save them from drowning or to pull them from a burning
building. One recent account of such dramatic altruists is Samuel
Oliner and Pearl Oliner's discussion of people who helped hide and
save Jews during the Nazi holocaust.10A strikingfinding is that these
life-saving altruists typically did not think they were doing anything
unusual or heroic; they were doing what anyone would do. Also in
the "dramatic"category is a voluminous line of research provoked by
a failure of altruism. This research, on bystanderintervention and
bystanderapathy, was begun as a result of a well-publicizedincident
in New York in which a woman was beaten to death as dozens of
neighbors looked on from their apartmentwindows.Bibb Latane and
John Darley, among others, attempted to bring this phenomenon into
the laboratoryto determine the variablesthat affect the likelihood of
intervention." They found that the likelihood of intervention decreases as the number of people who might intervene increases, as
the physical proximity of the victim decreases, as the anonymity of
the observersincreases, as the familiarityof the victim decreases,and
as the similarity of the victim to the observer decreases. People
are much more likely to help in small towns than in big cities,
they are much more likely to help people they know than strangers,
they are much more likely to help people who are like them (in race,
class, ethnicity) than people who are not, and they are much more
likely to help if they are the only ones around. What is sometimes lost
in all this analyticaldetail, however, is that most of the time, people
do help. For example, in one series of studies that investigated the
likelihood that young children and adolescents would come to the aid
of an injured victim, fully 80 percent of subjects provided help.12So
although people do not always help, they usually do.
In the category of more mundane acts of altruismare instances of
giving to charity. Survey data indicate that more than 90 percent of
Americans give to charity (more than 20 million American families
give 5% or more of their incomes), and almost 50 percent do some
In what may be the classic study of giving,
kind of volunteer work."13
RichardTitmuss surveyed 4,000 blood donors in England and found
that only a small percentage of the donors expected to get anything--either directly or indirectly-in return. The language they
used to explain their behavior was a moral language emphasizing
responsibilityand obligation rather than interest or egoism. Titmuss
also observed that in nations like the United States, where "donors"
could sell their blood rather than giving it, the language of interest
came to replace the language of responsibility.14
In addition to these examples of altruism, there are many examples
of related phenomena-of
sharing resources and cooperating on projects when neither is required by the situation, indeed even when the
situation mitigates against cooperation or sharing. A classic example
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of a situation that pits cooperation against self-interest is found in
game theory, specifically in what is called the Prisoner's Dilemma. In
a classic Prisoner's Dilemma, each of two players may choose either
to cooperate or to defect, and points are awarded to each based on
his or her choices. Each player will do best if he or she defects and
the other cooperates, and both players will do better if they both
cooperate than if they both defect. The logic of the game dictates that
unless the game has multiple turns, so that players can retaliate for
defections, the only rational move for either player is defection. The
result is that both players end up worse off than they would if they
had cooperated.
In a game with multiple turns, however, cooperation can emerge
as the dominant (i.e., most successful) strategy. Studies of the Prisoner's Dilemma have been used by Robert Axelrod and others to
suggest the structural conditions necessary (principally, the possibility of retaliation for noncooperation) for cooperation to emerge
among self-interested individuals.'5 However, recent research shows
that many of these conditions are actually unnecessary. In Prisoner's
Dilemma-like situations, subjects cooperated even when the games
involved only one turn and their own choices were made anonymously. They cooperated even when cooperation could gain them
nothing and could cost them substantially. The critical determinant
of whether cooperation occurred was whether the people playing
the game had an opportunity to communicate with one another
prior to making their choices. Even brief group discussion was sufficient to engender in most subjects enough group identification and
group solidarity that they felt bound to choose with group, not
individual, interests in mind.16 What this recent finding suggests is
that Prisoner's Dilemma defections will reliably occur only when
participants in a game are deprived of any opportunity to form
any social bond. The presumptions of individualism, atomism, and
egoism may have blinded previous investigators to the powerful
effects of social solidarity and led to experiments conducted in a
context in which solidarity could not possibly form. It appears that
if solidarity can form, it will, and the logic of self-interest will be
submerged as a result.
Much of the research that has been done on cooperation and sharing
has been done with children in school settings. Although results tend
to vary with age, children do a substantial amount of spontaneous
cooperating and sharing, and it is not very difficult to induce children
to cooperate and share still more.17 Because the typical classroom is
not set up to encourage cooperation (children are required to work
independently, social interaction among students is regarded as disruptive behavior, and teachers often use competitive incentives), it is all
the more remarkable that it appears.
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Studies of cooperation, of sharing, and of helping even among preschool children, done both in the laboratoryand in the home, demonstrate high frequencies of cooperationand sharing. In one such study,
children between the ages of 3 and 7 were observed in play situations
in which opportunities to help, comfort, or share with another child
were possible. In the laboratory,more than half of the childrenstudied
displayed at least one of these prosocialbehaviorsduring a 40-minute
observationperiod. During a similarobservationperiod in the home,
almost 90 percent of the children acted selflessly.'8Severalother studies have produced similar results.'9
Taken together,these phenomena, and many others like them, make
it clearthat altruisticbehavior,whetherdramaticor mundane,is not the
least bit unusual. Helping, comforting,sharing,and cooperatingoccur
among children and adults. They occur in school and in the home.
They occur among acquaintancesand among strangers.Although such
behaviordoes not alwaysoccur, it occurssufficientlyfrequently,in sufficiently diverse settings, that to deny the existence of genuine altruism
requiresextraordinaryacts of creativeinterpretation.
With all these diverse examples, I have yet to mention the class of
altruistic behavior that is most pervasive-the behavior that occurs
among members of a family.The subdisciplineof evolutionarybiology
known as sociobiology was essentially created to explain how these
blatant and ubiquitous acts of self-sacrificeamong family members
can be reconciled with a general theory (naturalselection)whose logic
seems to demand selfishness.20Selfish genes, inclusivefitness, and kin
selection are all postulated to show that deep down, self-sacrificeis
really selfish. Sociobiologyhas been subjectto substantialscrutinyand
criticism,especially when it is applied to human behavior, but this is
not the place to rehearse the arguments." Leaving debates about
sociobiologyaside, if altruism is understood to mean "devotionto the
interests of others," one glance at the behavior of families should
convince us that it is everywhere.

Variables Affecting Altruism
Given that altruism does indeed occur, what can be said about the
variables that influence its occurrence? Research on this topic has
looked both at the individualand at the social context. It has explored
whether altruismmight be related to traitsof characteror personality
and how it is affected by transient emotional or motivationalstates. It
has examined in detail the socializationprocess for factorsin the process of social development that might promotealtruism.The literature
is too voluminous to reviewhere.22Thus, my discussionwillbe cursory,
with an emphasis in the next section on what research in social development suggests are the necessary ingredients of altruism and the socialization experiences that promote it.
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One variable that seems positively related to altruism and other
forms of prosocial behavior is self-esteem. Although the literature is
equivocal, most research has found that people-adults and children-with a positive self-concept are more likely to be helpful than
people whose self-esteem is weak.23If one is sure of oneself, it seems
easier to extend oneself to others. However, there are exceptions to
this generalization. People with an extremely high opinion of themselves may feel no need to be connected to others, and people with a
low opinion of themselves may be helpful just to garner social approval.24Thus, it seems thatjust the right amountof self-esteem(whatever that might be) promotes altruism.
Still less clear is the relation of gender to altruism. In recent years,
research on moral reasoning has led to the view that whereas men
tend to be guided in their reasoning by an ethic of "rights,"women
tend to be guided by an ethic of "care,connection,and responsibility."25
This difference in the criteriaused for makingmoraljudgments might
lead one to suspect that women are more likely to be altruisticthan
men. However, research does not bear this expectation out. There
are some studies in which women are more likely to help than men,
but there are also studies in which the reverse is true, and there are
many studies in which there seems to be no effect of gender.26And
importantly,in one study of preschoolers, children who are presumably too young to have strongly developed gender roles, there were
no observablegender differences in either helping, sharing, or moral
reasoning.27
Two other variablesthat may be related to altruismare politicaland
religious affiliation. In the political domain, there is some evidence
that liberalsscore higher than conservativeson tests of moral reasoning, and that conservatives are more likely than liberals to hold the
'just-world"view that people basicallyget what is coming to them.28
These findings suggest potential differences in altruisticbehavior,but
I know of no studies that have found such differences. In the case of
religion, many studies completed over the last 25 years have failed to
find any relation between degree of religious conviction and a wide
range of different kinds of altruisticactivity.29One recent study, however, suggests that failures to find a relation between religious conviction and altruism may stem from measures of religious conviction
that are too crude. Daniel Batson and colleagues distinguishedamong
religious people those who see religion as a means to extrinsic ends,
those who see it as an end in itself, and those who see it as a quest.
Only among people in the latter group was helping positivelyrelated
to religiosity.s0Thus, if the relation between religious conviction and
altruism is to be explored further, care must be taken to measure
not only how religious individuals are, but what the content of their
religious commitments is.
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The only clear picture that emerges from the discussion thus far is
that there is no clear picture. However, one variablethat does seem
to figure prominently in the degree of altruism people display is the
extent to which potential altruistsidentify with the individualsor the
group they will be helping. People are more inclined to help those who
are perceived as similarto themselvesthan those who are perceived as
different.31They are more likely to help members of their own racial
or ethnic group than members of different groups.32Even when
"groups"are establishedin the laboratoryby means of a few minutes
of discussion, the amount of group-serving, cooperative behavior is
enhanced.33The anecdotal observation,confirmed by some empirical
research, that people who live in small towns or rural settings are
more likely to help than those who live in cities may in part be the
result of group identificationthat small-townlife makes possible and
urban life prevents.34Altruisticacts that depend on group identification are susceptible to interpretationsthat suggest they are ultimately
egoistic and self-interested,either by engenderingfuture reciprocation
(reciprocalaltruism)or by derivingsome benefits to one's social standing. Although there are several studies that have tried with some
success to rule these "ultimate self-interest" interpretations out,
there seems to be an endless supply of new possibilitieswaiting in the
wings to replace self-interest hypotheses that have been empirically
eliminated."s5

Altruism and Socialization
Whenever a claim is made that some characteristicor other is "human
nature," attempts to evaluate the claim turn almost immediately to
development. In light of the troika of presumptions about human
nature with which I began this article-individualism, atomism, and
egoism-researchers have paid a great dealof attentionto the development of social behavior. If egoism is human nature, and positive social
activity is a result of socialization,then we should expect to find that
positive social behaviorincreaseswith development.If, however, there
is something "natural"about positive social behavior, then we should
see signs of it very early on. Although studies of development that
have attempted to resolve this issue have been inconclusive,they have
suggested what some of the requisite components of positive social
behavior are, and what kinds of developmental experience seem to
foster those components.36
In an influential account of the development of altruism, Martin
Hoffman suggests that altruism has two requirements, one affective
and one cognitive."7 Genuine altruism requires empathy (affective)
and perspective taking (cognitive). One's distress at the distress of
another can be direct and immediate. It is painful, for example, to
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hear infants cry-even for other infants.38However, this empathy
may not lead to altruism. Indeed, it may lead to escape if the affect is
intense enough. For empathy to lead to altruism,it must be combined
with perspective taking. To be able to feel what another is feeling
(empathy) requires substantialunderstanding(perspective taking) of
what the other is experiencing. Hoffman refers to this kind of affect
combined with perspective taking as sympathy. According to Hoffman, children move from empathy to sympathy in stages as their
cognitive sophisticationincreases.39
Although both empathy and perspective taking are necessary for
altruism, neither is sufficient. One can experience intense distress at
the distress of another, but without an accompanyingunderstanding
of the source and nature of the distress, one might act only to relieve
the distress in oneself (e.g., by escaping) or act to try to relieve the
distress of the other in a way that is entirely inappropriate.Similarly,
one can have a thorough understandingof the perspectiveof the other
but use this only to serve one's own interests(e.g., by avoidinga similar
situation oneself). To behave altruistically,one must both understand
what the other is experiencing and want to do something about it.
As I indicatedabove, researchon altruismin children, both in laboratory settings and in the home, suggests that it is abundant.40Most
18-month-olds will share something with another person, and most
children between 18 and 24 months will respondpositivelyto another's
distress. Thus, even before much of the requisite cognitive development has occurred,instancesof altruismare common. However, there
are also individual differences among children in altruism, and at
least some evidence suggests that the different responses to others in
distresswhen children are quite young can predict how these children
will respond as much as 5 years later.41The existence of individual
differences, together with the suggestion that early differences may
be perpetuated, prompts one to investigate the socializationvariables
that may enhance or retard altruisticbehavior.
The first place to look for socialization effects is at the relations
between parents and children. Hoffman identified several child-rearing variablesthat affect the degree of altruismdisplayedby children.42
First, parents can enhance altruismby engaging in altruisticbehavior
themselves. Second, parents can enhance altruism by using certain
disciplinary techniques when their children are responsible for another's distress. By using what Hoffman calls "inductive,"as opposed
to punitive, discipline, a parent can turn a child's transgressionsto
good effect. Inductive discipline stresses the effects of the child's behavior on others, emphasizing long-range, perhaps unforeseen, effects, both psychological and physical, and steps that may be taken to
ameliorate the consequences of the child's transgression. Such disciplinary techniques possess moral content; that is, the parent makes
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clear that the child's actions not only had unfortunate effects, but that
they were wrong. The constructive and reparative character of the
induction seems to result in the child's internalization of the appropriate moral norm, making similar transgressions less likely in the
future and spontaneous reparations more likely, should transgressions
occur. In contrast with inductive discipline, discipline based on creating fear of future punishment, or discipline based on the assertion of
parental power or on the direct withdrawal of parental love do not
have salutary effects on the likelihood of future altruistic behavior.
On Hoffman's account, inductive discipline succeeds in promoting
altruism where other techniques fail because by emphasizing the plight
of the victim the parent triggers empathic distress in the child. Other
disciplinary techniques may also trigger distress, but the distress will
be focused on the (future) plight of the self rather than on the victim.
There is also some reason to believe that inductive discipline may
promote altruism by encouraging children to reason about the moral
significance of their actions, something that even young children seem
able and willing to do.43
In addition to using inductive discipline, parents can promote altruism by providing whatever discipline they provide in a context of
substantial parental affection. Persistent and abundant parental affection can reduce the child's focus or preoccupation with his or her
own emotional needs, thus making it easier for sympathy and perspective taking to occur.
Although the home is certainly the central domain for socialization
in childhood, it is not the only one. Much socialization occurs in the
classroom. Cooperative learning and play settings in the classroom
seem to enhance children's perspective-taking abilities.44 They also
seem to enhance self-esteem, which, as noted earlier, contributes to
prosocial behavior.45 Children with substantial experience cooperating
in the classroom are more likely than other children to help others or
to donate some of their resources to others."46Conversely, explicitly
competitive classroom situations seem to reduce all of these prosocial
effects.47 There is also some evidence that in addition to providing
opportunities for cooperation, schools can facilitate altruism by putting children into mixed-age groups."48Because children of different
ages are expected to perform at different levels, mixing age groups
discourages implicit competition. It also gives older children practice
in perspective taking as they try to help the younger ones.
Friendship also positively influences prosocial behavior." Studies of
play in children from as young as 12 months to as old as 10 years
indicate that turn taking and sharing are the rule. Despite the old
Piagetian lore to the contrary, when young children speak as they
play, the majority of their speech is social, not egocentric. The speech
of each child is coordinated with the group'sjoint activities. As children
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get older (ages 6-7), friendshipsseem to be defined by strictreciprocity, but by the time they reach age 9 or 10, reciprocityis replaced by
a richer understandingof mutual commitmentand obligationin which
children acknowledge a principle much like "fromeach according to
his abilities and to each according to his needs." The friendship becomes a unit that is different from (more than) the individualneeds
and wants of the participants.At this age, children seem to realize
that friendships take work and long-term commitment. The children
seem no longer to see themselves(if they ever did) as the psychological
atoms that most psychologicaltheories presume.
None of these findingsshould come as much of a surprise.Millennia
Ethics,Aristotle observed that it is hard to be
ago, in his Nicomachean
good-that being good takes practice. This practice occurs in the
routine activitiesof daily life. If daily life is properlystructured,being
good becomes automatic.The literatureon socializationand altruism
confirms Aristotle's views by showing that when the home and the
classroomare structuredto give the child practicein prosocialbehavior, such behavior becomes much more likely.
If practice at being good is a good thing, it seems natural to do
whateverone can to encourage children to practice.This has led some
investigators to study the effects of reward for prosocial behavior.
Because rewards can be used effectively in general to strengthen desired behavior,it seems only naturalto use them to encourage cooperation or altruism. It seems especially natural if one believes that such
behavioroccurs only when it serves the interestsof the actor.A system
of rewards for prosocial behavior can be seen as assuring that it will
be in the individual'sinterests to be good.
The results of such studies paint a coherent picture. When rewards
are contingent on various forms of prosocial behavior, they increase
the frequency of the behavior-as long as the rewardscontinue to be
present. If the rewards are withdrawn, the prosocial behavior decreases. Thus, unless one expects contingent rewards for prosocial
behaviorto be a permanentand ubiquitouspartof the socialscene, one
cannot rely on them to be the primarysourceof prosocialbehavior.We
can understandsuch results from the frameworkprovidedby attribution theory.5oImagine a child who helps a playmate in distress. The
child might seek to explain his or her helping behavior-to make a
causal attribution.If no rewardsare present, likely causal attributions
would involve the state of distress of the victim, the understanding
that helping is the right thing to do, and other explanationsthat focus
on factors intrinsic to the act of helping. But the presence of revards
offers an alternative, and apparently dominant, causal candidate. "I
did it for the reward,"the child might say to him- or herself. With
that understanding of his or her motivation, it would come as no
surprise if altruisticacts were not forthcomingwhen rewardswere not
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available. This is just a particularclass of a much more general and
well-documentedphenomenon-the underminingof intrinsicmotivation by extrinsic rewards.51
For example, in one study, second and third graderswho were given
rewards for helping were less likely to explain their own behavior in
terms of intrinsic motivationto help than were children who did not
receive rewards.52In another study, children were praised (social reward) or merely told that they were helpful people for making donations to another. Only in the lattercase was the likelihood of donation
high in a subsequentfollow-up study.53In anotherstudyof elementary
school children, it was found that their mothers' tendency to use rewards as socializationtools was negatively correlated with the likelihood that the children would help when unobserved in free-play settings.54Results similarto these have been obtainedwith adult subjects.
The presence of extrinsicrewardsdecreasedtheir perception of themselves as altruisticand decreased the likelihood that they would help
again at a later time without rewards.Conversely,experimenterinterventions that focused on the altruisticnature of the subjectsincreased
the likelihood of future altruisticbehavior.55
The literature on the use of rewards to promote altruism should
remind the reader of where this article began. It began with a set
of presumptions that, taken together, made genuine altruism seem
impossible.Because of the inherentlyatomistic,self-interestedcharacter of human nature, there simply had to be something in it for the
altruist. Not only that, but that "something"that served self-interest
had to be the cause of the altruisticact. In other words, it would not
do to suggest that although altruistsget satisfactionfrom their altruistic acts, that is not the reason they do them-that they do them because
they are the right things to do, and the satisfactionis a bonus. From
within the presumptions of atomism and egoism, such an account is
naive at best. The actors themselves may believe that their acts are
motivated by obligation, responsibility, and commitment, but what
really keeps them going is some kind of direct payoff. Thinking like
this makes it perfectly natural to use extrinsic rewardsto beef up the
payoff for altruisticacts; extrinsic rewardsare seen as making only a
quantitative change in the incentive structure of a situation, not a
qualitativeone.
When theorists who hold the view that genuine altruismis impossible are presented with examples of altruism,they try to explain them
by appealing to one or another mechanism of self-interest. Appeals
to kin selection and inclusive fitness are the way sociobiologyhandles
altruism toward offspring or other genetic relatives. Reciprocal altruism is one way sociobiologists (and other social scientists) handle the
fact that altruism is much more likely among people who know one
another or who are alike in some significant way. The rewarding power
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of praise and social approval is another way such acts of altruism are
handled. And when empathy (or sympathy)is introduced as an essential ingredient of altruistic behavior, the atomists suggest that the
altruist acts only to relieve the distress that is created by his or her
empathy.
In principle, one could test these variousself-interest-basedalternatives to genuine altruismby creating experimentalsituationsin which
genuinely altruisticmotives and self-interestedmotiveswill push people to behave differently. Batson and his associateshave been doing
precisely this for the last several years.56Thus, for example, Batson
has providedevidence that empathy and personaldistressat the plight
of another are actually distinct and essentially independent affective
states. This finding makes the claim that empathy-basedaltruism is
really motivated by the relief of personal distress more difficult to
sustain. He has also shown that the mood of altruisticactorsis affected
by whether or not the victim actually gains relief from his or her
unfortunate situation and not by whether they happen to have been
the agents responsible for that relief. This finding makes the claim
that altruism is really only the pursuit of social approval and status
more difficult to sustain.
Although careful,analyticexperimentscan be done to test particular
egoistic explanationsof altruisticbehavior,there seems to be an endless
supply of such explanations.Egoisticaccountsof altruismwillcontinue
to sprout, like weeds, and investigatorswill face the task of evaluating
and rejecting them, one by one, indefinitelyunless the ground can be
replowed and some of the presumptions that dominate the human
sciences be replaced. I turn to an examination of this possibilitynext.

On the Different Modes of Social Relations
A likely reason why the presumptionsof modernsocial science-individualism,atomism,and egoism-have been so pervasivelyand uncritically embracedis that they conjure up a picture of human beings and
sociallife that is very much like the life that mostpeople live in modern,
Western societies. The ideology of the marketplaceexhorts people to
pursue their own interests and trust in the system to take care of
social welfare in general. The ideology of rights protects people, as
autonomous individuals,from having to submit to the will of the majority. And much of the ideologyexplicit or implicitin pop psychology
encourages people to aspire to autonomy and independence-to find
out, and to do, what is right for them and not worry so much about
the consequences for others. The extent to which modern life has
actually been influenced by the individualist presumptions of the social
sciences, as opposed to just influencing them, is an interesting question, best left for another place. For now, it is sufficient to note that
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a Western social scientist who casually observes the character of the
lives that surround him or her would have little reason even to investigate these individualist presumptions, let alone cast about for an
alternative.
A way out of this myopia is through cross-cultural investigation,
and there is of course a long history of cross-cultural research in
the social sciences. But there is no guarantee that a cross-cultural
perspective will eliminate the bedrock presumption that the many and
varied cultural proscriptions and prescriptions one observes are simply
laid on top of a human nature that is universal. It is possible to argue,
in other words, that although different cultures may induce people
to behave more altruistically than our culture does, such cultures are
only papering over basic human nature more than we do.
Although this view may never have been extremely plausible, it was
certainly extremely popular, at least among psychologists who took
as their task the discovery of the universals of human nature. The
call it
emergence of a new subdiscipline in the social sciences-some
"cultural psychology"-has challenged this view by suggesting that
the effects of culture do not merely paper over the human nature
that lies underneath, but instead penetrate all the way down, affecting
not only what people take to be self-interest, and what they will do to
serve self-interest, but even what they take to be a self.57 For example,
Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama have recently shown that the
boundaries that separate the self from others are very much culturespecific.58 In cultures like that of the United States, the self is construed
as an independent entity. Independence, autonomy, and "self-actualization" are prized, and the values and preferences of each individual
are given a status independent of the values and preferences of others.
The individualist presumptions of social science are tailor-made for a
self like this. In other cultures, even industrial cultures like Japan, the
self is construed as an interdependent entity. Significant others form
a part of the self, and their values and preferences are, in significant
respects, one's own. The Japanese term sunao, used to label a trait
that parents nurture and value in their children, "assumes cooperation
to be an act of affirmation of the self."" In cultures like this, people
are not faced with the choice between self-interest and altruism, at
least not in the way that Americans face it. Also, the need to explain
away altruism evaporates as the distinction between doing something
because it makes you feel better and doing it because it makes the
other feel better blurs. If the other is part of you, then acts of altruism
become simultaneously impossible and ubiquitous. They become impossible because "devotion to the interests of others" is not "opposed
to egoism," and they become ubiquitous because devotion to the interests of others is a part of everyone's everyday life. In cultures like this,
many of the conflicts Americans routinely face between doing the
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right thing and doing the self-interested thing also evaporate. No
doubt they are replaced by different conflicts,but these different conflicts will be reflections of fundamentallydifferent selves, with fundamentally different notions of value and of self-interest.
Markusand Kitayamadiscuss several essential differences between
the independentself and the interdependentself, many of which have
implications for the study of altruism. For the independentself, relations with others are typicallymeans to individualends. This is what
opens up all acts of altruismto egoistic interpretation.In contrast, to
the interdependentself, relations with others are ends in themselves.
The key propertiesof the independentself are internaland privatesuch psychologicalentities as abilities,thoughts, and feelings. In contrast, the key properties of the interdependentself are public-such
social entities as roles, status, and social relations. The key tasks for
the independentself are to be unique, to express oneself, and to pursue
one's personal goals. The key tasks of the interdependentself are to
belong, to fit in, to occupy one's proper place, and to promote the
goals of others. Success for the independent self comes from selfexpression and self-realization,whereas for the interdependentself, it
comes from self-restraint and adjustment to the demands of social
harmony. It may seem that adopting an interdependentconstrual of
the self means giving up the desire for agency and for achievement.
But Markus and Kitayama point out that it need not mean either.
Agency (control)and achievementmay be seen as extremelyimportant
and valuable-in the service, however, of group, rather than individual, goals.
It should be obvious that in a culture characterizedby an interdependent construal of the self, acts of altruism become so unremarkable
that they almost disappear as a category that is distinct from selfinterested acts. Attempts to distinguish selfish from unselfish motives
for prosocialacts become almost nonsensical. Researchlike this opens
up the presumptions of modern social science to careful inspectionby
showingjust how culturallyspecificthey are. It also begs for researchers to evaluate the extent to which cultural influences on prosocial
behavior dominate the more individual influences that psychologists
are much more accustomed to searching for.
Markus and Kitayamaestablish a sharp contrast between extreme
on
individualism,on the one hand, and extreme "communitarianism,"
the other, and it is possible that one can find culturesin which people
live at one or the other extreme in all domains of their lives. What
seems more plausible, however, even in extremely individualistcultures like ours, is that the same individuallives by different rules in
different domains, that the same individual can be (appropriately)
more or less individualisticdepending on the setting in which actions
must be chosen. Alan Fiske has recently fleshed out this possibilityby
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suggesting that there are four fundamentallydifferent rule systems
that capture virtuallyall the forms of social interaction one observes
in all cultures.60What distinguishes cultures from one another is the
domains in which each of these rule systemsoperates. Some of these
rule systemsare likely to encourage interdependentselves, and others,
independent selves. Thus, the kind of self one has may depend on
which of these rule systems is dominant in one's culture.
Fiske refers to the four rule systems as communalsharing,authority
ranking, equality matching, and marketpricing. The communal sharing

rule system makes a fundamental distinction between us and them,
that is, between members and nonmembers of the community. All
individualswithin the community are regarded as equivalent to one
another and as distinct from all those outside the community. In a
communal sharing relation, people treat material objects as things
that all membersof the group hold in common. People take what they
need and contributewhat they can, and no one keeps score. In cultures
that are dominated by communal-sharingrelations, land tends to be
freely availablefor use by anyone who needs it, work tends to be done
collectively,and the productsof the workare freely available.Decisions
tend to be made by consensus. In cultures like ours, where communal
sharing is not the dominant form of social life, it nevertheless is common in some domains, like the family. For many, a significantgoal is
to have communal sharingrelationsextend outside the familyto larger
units of the social world-to friends, to neighbors, to people of the
same faith, or with the same ethical commitments. Within members
of the group-however the group is defined and however large it
gets--actions are meant to be governed by an ethic of care and responsibility, and people are expected to treat one another with kindness
(in both senses of the word; as Fiske points out, people are expected
to treat members of their own kind with kindness). Within a social
network run by principles of communal sharing, the boundaries between self and other will be fuzzy, and thus, distinguishing between
egoism and altruism will be difficult and perhaps pointless. People
who grow up in cultures dominated by communal sharing seem to
reason quite differently than do people in U.S. culture about which
kinds of prosocial acts requirejustificationsand which kinds of justifications are appropriate.61
Authority ranking, as the name implies, ranks people relative to
one another. Some people are better than (higher than, more importantthan) others. Socialgroups that run by authority-rankingrules
ctend to be rather rigid, hierarchical,and authoritarian.People expect
to be treated by (and to treat) others in ways that are entirely determined by their relative positions in the rankings. The material goods
they get, and what they have to do to get them, the respect and admiration they receive from others, and what they have to give others in
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return all are determined by their relative social position. Although
there are some cultures that are dominated by this form of social

organization, U.S. culture obviouslyis not, although one sees it in the
military, in industry, in some religious groups, in some families, and
in other settings where there is a clear chain of command. In a domain

ruled by authority ranking, who does what, who gets what, and how

decisions are made will be very different than they are in a domain

ruled by communal sharing. Altruisticbehavior may again be hard to

discern, not because the boundaries between self and other are fuzzy,

but because the duties and obligationsspecifiedby one's social position
may be so well detailed that altruism may never be required as a motive

nor empathy as a triggering affect.

Equality-matching rules of social interaction focus on equity, reciprocity, and fairness. In contrast to communal sharing, in which people give
as they are able and take as they need, and in contrast to authority
ranking, in which people give and take according to their established
social positions, equality-matching systems turn on notions of fair compensation for effort and appropriate reciprocation for acts of kindness. In
contrast to the marketplace, with which we are so familiar, the objective of
exchange is not profit, but equity, and the mechanism of exchange is
not contract, but trust. People take turns and try to give back what they
get-neither more (for that might be either insulting or foolish) nor less
(for that would be a moral violation). Thus, for example, when people
reciprocate for dinner parties, their objective (if they are operating within
the spirit of an equality-matching system) is to offer hospitality that will
be essentially equivalent to what they received. Reciprocation that is too
spartan or informal will insult their former hosts, whereas reciprocation
that is too lavish will embarass them. Equity, not superiority, and matching, not profiting, are the goals.
There are countless examples of equality-matching social relations
across a wide range of cultures. People help their neighbors raise
buildings or harvest crops and receive reciprocation at another time.
People send one another Christmas cards and gifts. Senators and congresspeople vote for one another's pet legislation. Friends take turns
baby-sitting for one another's children. In all such cases, the objective
seems to be equality. In some instances, people go so far to insure
equality that they give back exactly the same things that they have
previously received.62 The point of such exchanges, Fiske suggests, is
not material gain, but rather to cement the equality-matching relation
itself. Indeed, there is evidence that people will reject exchanges in
which they benefit over their partners and prefer exchanges that are
equitable.63 In his very influential work on the nature of justice, John
Rawls gives equality matching great prominence in suggesting that a
system of equal distribution of wealth is what individuals would choose
if they were forced to choose from behind a "veil of ignorance" that
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concealed what their position would be when society was constructed
and wealth was distributed.64
Several studies of the development of reciprocity in children suggest
that a sensitivity to equality-matching relations is present fairly early.
Toddlers have been shown to share toys with one another based on
whether the other toddler previously shared with them.65 In a study
in which 3-5-year-old children had the opportunity to share food
with friends or acquaintances, although there were few spontaneous
offers to share, children usually responded positively to the requests
of others. And in subsequent tests, children's willingness to share was
very much dependent on how their requests for food had been treated
previously.66 Finally, in another study, first graders evaluated acts of
positive reciprocation more highly than acts of altruism, suggesting
that for them, equity may be more highly valued than charity."'
As in the case of communal sharing and authority ranking, it is
difficult to know how to fit altruistic behavior into a social scheme run
by equality-matching rules. If, indeed, equality matching is important
to people precisely because it helps strengthen the relation of which
it is a characteristic, then offering help to others can be understood
as serving the self. This will be true so long as equality matching is a
goal of a social relation. It does not follow from this, of course, that
one's reasons for helping or sharing or giving actually are self-serving.
It is just that in a system that is equity based, any actions that serve
the needs of another will also serve the self, so long as all participants
are playing by the same rules. What this implies is that the distinction
between altruistic and egoistic is not especially helpful in an equalitymatching context.
The final social rule system discussed by Fiske, the one to which
modern Americans are perhaps most accustomed, is the market-pricing system. Market pricing is what governs relations in the market,
where it is understood that people are interested not in equity, but in
gain, and where the principal lubricant of exchange is not trust, but
contract. Market pricing is enormously facilitated by (perhaps even
made possible by) a medium of exchange like money. Money makes
it possible for people to engage in transactions anonymously and by
long distance. As Fiske puts it, transactions need leave no traces because they can be paid for there and then. There is no need to keep
score and no need to expect explicit and direct reciprocation. The
market as a system enables more indirect reciprocation. Buyers do not
require that the people who sell to them turn around and buy from
them. All that is required is that there be some (anonymous) buyers
for every seller. Money also makes it possible to exchange things that
seem incomparable to one another based on their intrinsic properties.
So long as each thing can be given a dollar value, a price, then things
that are intrinsically quite different can be regarded as equivalent if
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they have the same price. This permitsa kind of fluidityand freedom
in socialrelationsthat the other typesof socialrulesdo not. Forexample,
in an equality-matchingframework,how does one go about deciding
whetherany reciprocationfor a dinner invitationexcepta returndinner
invitationis equitable?Because the value of such social acts is not just
their price-indeed, may be totallyunrelatedto their price-the only
way to assure equity is to reciprocatein kind.With marketpricingand
a medium of exchange,this is no longer necessary.Value is price,everything has a price, and everythingcan be exchanged.
It is the market-pricingsystem of social relations to which the individualist, egoist presumptions of social science seem especially well
suited. This may not be an inevitablecharacteristicof market-pricing
social rules. However, because the institution that embodies those
rules-the market-is based on the presumption that the only point
of exchange is profit, it is quite likely that self-interestwill appear to
rule. Furthermore, in addition to being guided by the ideology of
self-interest, market exchange makes possible transactions between
anonymous agents, thereby decreasingthe chances that any agent will
even know the interests of the people with whom he or she interacts,
let alone cater to them. Thus, people are not expected or supposed
to be altruistic in market transactions,and if they nevertheless want
to be, they probablywill not know how to do it.
It is hardly surprising that if the market relations are taken as the
model for social relations, investigatorswill be extremely suspiciousof
apparent acts of altruism and will be on the lookout for the selfish
interests that are "actually"being served. That is, a certain amount of
tunnel vision will have been created by the investigators'theoretical
presumptions. But there is more going on than mere theory-guided,
selective perception of the world. If people actually live in a world
that is dominated by marketrelations,it becomes much less likely that
they will engage in genuine acts of altruism.There are some data that
suggest that even though people are not, in general, inclined to act
egoistically, they will do so when they think they are being exploited.
And the marketplace,in explicitly sanctioning the unbridled pursuit
of self-interest (and the caveat emptor that accompanies it), permits
and even encouragesexploitation.So in a societydominatedby market
pricing, people may be utterlyegoistic-in self-defense.The combina.tion of a social science that is prepared to see only egoism and social
institutions that are prepared to foster only egoism virtuallyguarantees that egoism is all that the society will get.
Changing

Social Structures and Changing Social Values

The critical idea suggested in the work of Fiske and of Markusand
Kitayamais that the frequency of behavior that we might regard as
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altruisticis likely to depend more on the social structureswithin which
people live than on any essential and universal characteristicsof human nature. If people live in societiesin which the boundariesbetween
self and other are not sharp, and the rules of socialinteractionemphasize sharing or equity, they will behave quite differently from those
in societies that make clear distinctions between self and other and
emphasize the pursuit of self-interest. Said another way, egoists are
made, not born. The devotion to self-interest is not a "natural"part
of human nature, but it can be a part of human nature under the
right conditions. To see the egoist in full flower, one needs a society
organized around an unfettered market,from which socialinstitutions
that might restrictexchange have been systematicallyeliminated. The
market-pricingsystem is not made possible by egoists; rather,it makes
egoists possible. The implicationsof this idea for an account of social
behavior are significant. Remember, in the eyes of social science, the
presumptions of individualism, atomism, and egoism are not mere
descriptionsof particularpoints and placesin historyand culture.They
are scientificlaws, fundamentaltruths about the human organism and
the human condition. One way of thinking about laws in general is as
constraints on human activities. The law of gravity is one such constraint;it keeps people from flying about uncontrollably.The law that
prohibits going through red lights is another such constraint;it keeps
people from drivingtheir carsin whateverway they like. But these two
kindsof "laws"are obviouslyvery different. The constraintimposed by
gravityis not human made, not self-imposed,and it cannot be repealed
no matter how much people want to repeal it. The constrainton going
through red lights, in contrast, is self-imposed and easily repealed.
Which of these kinds of constraintsare the individualism,atomism,
and egoism of social science?The implicationof Fiske and of Markus
and Kitayama is that they are clearly like traffic laws, not gravity.
All the features of society that make egoism ring true are human
creations-creations that could be different, that indeed are different
in different cultures, and may once have been different in our own.68
One could imagine society moving in the future in directions that
undercutsome of the conditionson which egoism depends. One could
also imagine society moving in directions that permit the extension of
egoism to aspects of human life, like marriageand child rearing, that
they presently do not pervade. But either of these moves, should they
develop, will be the product of human discretion, not of natural
necessity.
If the laws of egoism are like trafficlaws rather than laws of gravity,
they are in need of justification or defense. Gravityrequires no defense; it simply is. Not so for traffic laws. We must defend the infringement on individual freedom they represent. It must be argued that
this set of traffic laws, and not some other, is the right one. Such a
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defense may not be difficult to make, but it will appeal to such things
as values and morals; it will depend on some understanding of what
is good for people and what is good for society. The rules of market
pricing can be defended in the same way. People can attempt to justify
them by appealing to human rights, freedoms, and entitlements. People can attempt to justify them by appealing to the goods, both social
and individual, that will derive from a market-pricing social system.
That is to say, market pricing and egoism can be defended-or attacked-on moral grounds. But they cannot be defended as just another gravitational constraint on human activity.
In order for moral discourse about the logic of egoism, or of markets,
to make any sense, people must be able to see that there are alternatives. Otherwise, moral discourse becomes idle drawing room conversation. In a society in which the market operates only in limited spheres
of life, and other expectations, standards, and rules operate in other
spheres, these other standards provide the concrete alternatives to the
market that make moral discourse worthwhile. People can argue about
whether this or that domain of life should run according to market
principles or some other principles. In this connection, it has been
suggested by several writers that late twentieth-century industrial societies are witnessing a spread of economic thinking to previously noneconomic domains.69 This "economic imperialism" has applied the
logic of rational choice to family life, to education, to the law, and to
political activity. Each time the scope of the market extends itself, it
becomes increasingly difficult for people to envision an alternative to
the logic of egoism. As a result, atomism and egoism become the only
game in town; they become "laws of nature" by default.
I can illustrate the way in which economic imperialism threatens to
subsume all other domains of life and the pursuit of different goals
that these domains make possible by focusing on a study done by
Daniel Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler.70 The study
concerned people's judgments of fairness over a range of different
hypothetical economic situations. Each of the situations was described,
and people were asked to assess whether the behavior in question in
each situation was fair or unfair. For example: A hardware store has
been selling snow shovels for $15. The morning after a large snowstorm, the store raises the price to $20. Is this fair?
A market-pricing answer to this question is that yes, of course it
is fair to charge $20. More accurately, the market-pricing answer
might be that "fairness" has nothing to do with it. The real question
is, Is it profitable? And this question will have different answers in
different circumstances. Now suppose one were operating from
a non-market-pricing, or not purely market-pricing, perspective.
Suppose that fairness implied a certain responsibility to meet the
needs of the community and to honor the loyalty of one's regular
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customers. Suppose that fairness appealed to some moral principle
that said one was entitled to a reasonable profit, but not to whatever
the traffic would bear. From within this perspective, one might well
decide that it was unfair to charge $20 for the shovel, even if one
could get away with it.
In the study, 82 pecent of the respondents judged the $20 price to
be unfair, suggesting that the majority of people do not make decisions
of this kind from within a purely market-pricing perspective.
Here is another example, a question with two variants:
A small photocopying shop has one employee who has worked in the shop
for 6 months and earns $9 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory,
but a factoryin the area has recentlyclosed and unemploymenthas increased.
Other small shops have now hired reliableworkersat $7 per hour to perform
jobs similarto those done by the photocopy shop employee. The owner of the
photocopying shop reduces the employee'swage to $7 per hour. Is this fair?
A small photocopying shop has one employee who has workedin the shop
for 6 months and earns $9 per hour. Business continues to be satisfactory,
but a factoryin the area has recentlyclosed and unemploymenthas increased.
Other small shops have now hired reliableworkersat $7 per hour to perform
jobs similar to those done by the photocopy shop employee. The current
employee leaves, and the owner of the photocopying shop decides to pay a
replacement$7 per hour. Is this fair?
Do these two questions evoke the same evaluation? From a purely
economic perspective, the situations are equivalent. Bosses pay the
lowest wage they can get away with. A supply of surplus labor enables
them to lower the wages of current employees or replace them with
unemployed people who will accept the lower wage. However, 83
percent of the respondents thought the first situation was unfair. This
is not because they believed that working in a photocopying shop was
simply worth $9 per hour, because 73 percent of the respondents
thought the second situation was fair. More likely, what was guiding
people's judgments was a sense that a "fair wage" was determined by
many things. One was the profit margin of the employer. Another
was what the going wage was for similar work in the area. But a third
was the wage history of the particular employees involved. That a
person was earning $9 per hour made that his "reference wage."
Barring real economic hardships on the part of the employer, the
reference wage could not fairly be reduced. It could certainly not be
reduced just because other people out there were willing to work for
a lower wage. That the reference wage was attached to the employee
and not the job is clear from people's willingness to pay a lower wage
for the same job if it went to a new employee.
It should not be concluded that the respondents in this study were
antiboss or anticapitalist. Respondents overwhelmingly agreed that it
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was fair to increase prices or decrease wages if profits were being
threatened, especiallyif the threat to profitscame from circumstances
outside the employer's control. In fact, respondentstreated increases
in profit as fair if they were the result not of increased prices or
decreased wages but instead of a cheaper source of raw materialsor
a more efficient production process. In other words, producers and
retailers were not required to pass their savings on to purchasers.
What people's responses to these examples point to is that the average person seems to think it is perfectly appropriate to apply moral
standardsin evaluating economic transactions.The market is not an
amoral playing field in which anything that is legal is acceptable.The
market is not a place in which the naked and unrestrainedpursuit of
self-interest is condoned. People may have come to expect the worst
in the market, but they have not yet come to accept it. Instead of
allowing economic considerationsto encroach on the moral domain,
the respondentsin this study seem to insistthat moralconsiderationsin this case, fairness-should encroachon the economicdomain.
If people are willing to impose standardsof fairness in the marketplace, as the respondentsin this study clearlywere, then perhaps my
concern about economic imperialismis an idle one. Perhaps,but I do
not think so. Standardsof fairness must originate somewhere, and
because there is no place for fairness within the domain of the market
(and its accompanyingmarket-pricingideology),these standardsmust
be developed in other domains. It seems likelythat they are developed,
encouraged, and sustained in various nonmarket institutions like the
family, the local community, the school, and the church. These standards are then imported, at least by some people, into market situations. So long as these nonmarket institutions retain their noneconomic characterand purpose, concern for fairness can continue to be
nurtured. But if they are invaded by economic considerations, the
nurturing of concern for fairness will surely weaken. The fact that
the respondents in this study showed concern for fairness may show
only that the nonmarket institutions that helped shape them had not
yet been deeply penetrated by economic considerations. However,
this offers no guarantees for the future. People possess no built-in
safeguards against the erosion of concern for fairness. There is nothing natural, automatic, or inevitable about this concern. It must be
learned, and it must be taught. And other things can be taught quite
easily in its place. Many of the questions about fairnessjust reviewed
were asked to a group of MBA students at a prestigious business
school. In general, their fairnessjudgments were quite different from
the judgments of the respondents in the original study. In general,
their judgments were that efforts to maximize profit were fair. All's
fair-from increasing prices to decreasing wages-in the market."71
Had the students learned this in their MBA program, or did they seek
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MBAs because they already believed it? Whicheverof these possibilities is true, it should make clear to us that there is no reason to count
on the concern for fairness as an ineluctable part of our approach to
social life.

Conclusion: The Fragilityof Altruism
AmartyaSen has argued that there is a source of concern for fairness
that the logic of egoism cannot encompass, indeed, that sometimes
leads to actions in direct violation of the logic of egoism.72He calls
this source of concern "commitment"and suggests that it cannot be
incorporated within the atomistic, egoistic framework.To act out of
commitment is to do what one thinks is right, what will promote the
public welfare, quite apart from whether it promotes one's own. It is
to act out of a sense of responsibilityas a citizen. Acts of commitment
include voting in large, general elections. They include doing one's
job to the best of one's ability--going beyond the terms of the contract,
even if no one is watching and there is nothing to be gained from it.
They includerefusing to chargewhat the trafficwillbear for necessities
during times of shortage, refusing to capitalizeon fortuitous circumstances at the expense of others.
Acts of commitment like these occur routinely.They are what holds
society together. But they are a problem for the logic of egoism. As
Sen says, "Commitment

drives a wedge between personal choice

and personal welfare, and much of traditionaleconomic theory relies
on the identity of the two." He continues:
The economic theory of utility
is sometimes criticizedfor having too
much structure;human beings are alleged to be "simpler"in reality
precisely the opposite seems to be the case: traditionaltheory has toolittlestructure. A person is given one preference ordering, and as and when the need
arises,this is supposed to reflecthis interests,representhis welfare,summarize
his idea of what should be done, and describehis actualchoices and behavior.
Can one preference ordering do all these things? A person thus described
may be "rational"in the limited sense of revealing no inconsistenciesin his

choicebehavior,butif he hasno useforthisdistinction
betweenquitedifferent
concepts, he must be a bit of a fool. The purelyeconomic man is indeed close

to beinga socialmoron.73

The existence of commitment casts the egoistic presumptions of
social science in a whole new light. True, when making economic
decisions, people will presumably choose that alternative that maximizes self-interest. But before they can do this, they have to make
another choice. They have to choose to make an economic decision
that is based on self-interest as against, say, a moral one that is based
on commitment. In addition to having a set of preferences among
commodities, people must be understood to have a set of preferences
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among their interests. Preferring one preference hierarchy over another amounts to preferring to be one kind of person over another,
preferring to have one kind of character over another. Any thorough
analysis of the logic of egoism must include an account of how people
choose their preferences and how culture contributes to the set of
preferences among which people choose. Much of modern social science takes this most fundamental aspect of human preference and
choice as a given.
Fiske points out that most societies are heterogeneous in the rule
systems they apply to the regulation of social life, although one may
be more dominant than the others. In our own society, despite the
dominance of market pricing, virtually all people have social relations
guided by each type of rule. Indeed, one's relations with the same
person may follow one rule system in one domain and a different rule
system in another. Imagine two friends who share completely and
indiscriminately their science fiction novels (communal sharing) and
at the same time work at a task (patching and painting an apartment)
in which one is the expert ordering the other around (authority ranking), who divide precisely their expenses and driving time for a crosscountry vacation (equality matching), and agree for one to buy the
other's old car at the going market price. It may be that what we
identify as essentially unlimited personal freedom in modern America
is, in part, the freedom to apply whichever rule system we like to
whatever domains of life we like, subject only to the agreement of the
people with whom we will be interacting. If this is true, then, in effect,
each of us has the power to decide whether to have an independent
self or an interdependent one, whether to live by the rules of the
market or to live by the rules of community, whether to obviate altruism by connecting our interests to the interests of others, or to obviate
it by creating a system in which only the egoists can survive.
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